codex-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted repository content for code analysis and adversarial review tasks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
git diffoutputs, file reads, and stdin redirection incodex execandcodex reviewcommands as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/code-review.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses template-based prompts in
references/adversarial-review-prompt.mdwith XML-style tags like<repository_context>and<task>to separate untrusted data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill documents the use of the
codexCLI which, depending on the sandbox mode (workspace-writeordanger-full-access), can modify the filesystem or perform network operations as shown in theSKILL.mdusage patterns. - Sanitization: The skill relies on the internal security mechanisms and sandbox modes of the external
codex-clitool (e.g.,--sandbox read-only) rather than performing its own data sanitization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is built upon the execution of several shell commands to manage repository state and interface with the Codex CLI.
- Evidence: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/code-review.mddirect the agent to usegit status,git diff,git symbolic-ref, and variouscodexsubcommands. - Context: These commands are necessary for the skill's stated purpose of delegating coding tasks and are used within a standard development workflow context.
Audit Metadata