skills/h00mankind/skills/build/Gen Agent Trust Hub

build

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's context recall and worktree auditing features read private AI agent chat transcripts from local storage.
  • Evidence: Accesses sensitive local directories including ~/.claude/projects/, ~/.codex/sessions/, ~/.local/share/muse/sessions/, and ~/.pi/agent/sessions/ to retrieve session history and identify active worktrees.
  • File Reference: references/poteto-mode/scripts/worktree-audit.mjs, references/reflect/scripts/claude-project-dir.mjs, and references/reflect/scripts/find-transcript.mjs.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic execution and process instrumentation.
  • Instrumentation: The "Runtime forensics" playbook instructs the agent to use Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) eval to inject and run code within live processes.
  • Code Generation: The "Hillclimb" and "Feature" playbooks involve iterative code generation, execution, and measurement cycles.
  • File Reference: references/poteto-mode/playbooks/runtime-forensics.md, references/poteto-mode/playbooks/hillclimb.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs runtime installation of external software dependencies.
  • Mechanism: The bootstrap.ts script executes bun install --frozen-lockfile to download and install Node.js packages from a public registry if they are not already present.
  • File Reference: references/poteto-mode/scripts/bootstrap.ts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes high-risk shell commands with broad system access.
  • Destructive Operations: Commands include git worktree remove --force, rm -rf, and the deletion of system simulators using xcrun simctl.
  • Automation: It performs automated repository management tasks such as gh pr merge with squash and head-commit matching.
  • File Reference: references/poteto-mode/playbooks/worktree-cleanup.md, references/poteto-mode/playbooks/shipping.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Processes external data from pull request comments, issue trackers (Linear, Jira), documentation (Notion, Confluence), and chat logs (Slack).
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates for investigators and synthesizers do not consistently utilize delimiters to isolate untrusted external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell command execution, file writing, subagent orchestration, and pull request merging.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for ingested textual content, although it does include a specific guard against formula injection in its own TSV logs.
  • File Reference: references/why/SKILL.ref.md, references/why/references/investigator-prompt.md, references/why/references/synthesizer-prompt.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Use of aggressive persona instructions.
  • Roleplay: The comment-sicko agent is defined with a "deranged" persona that is hostile toward code comments. While stylistic, such instructions can lead to unpredictable or non-compliant agent behavior.
  • File Reference: references/poteto-mode/references/agents/comment-sicko.md.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 14, 2026, 06:04 PM