finding-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and follows instructions from an external documentation site and processes security findings that could contain adversarial content.
- Ingestion points:
docs.hacktron.ai/llms.txt(remote documentation) andapi.hacktron.ai/v1/findings(finding data including proof-of-concept and descriptions) mentioned inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is instructed to "follow the docs" and "triage each finding" without explicit delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded prompts within the external data.
- Capability inventory: Across the
SKILL.mdworkflow, the agent has access toRead,Grep, andGlobfor file inspection,Writefor applying fixes, andBashfor executingcurl,jq, andgitcommands. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or sanitization of the remote documentation or finding data is performed before the agent processes the content.
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