reflect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a self-improving instruction loop that extracts learnings from conversation transcripts. This creates a vulnerability surface where untrusted data encountered during a session (such as content from an external file or web search) could be identified as a correction and permanently written into the agent's skill files or the global
CLAUDE.mdconfiguration. - Ingestion points:
scripts/extract_signals.pyparses transcript files located in~/.claude/session-env/. - Capability inventory: The skill can write to instruction files using
scripts/update_skill.pyandscripts/promote_learning.py, and modifies its own repository viascripts/reflect.py. - Boundary markers: The system utilizes markdown headers like
## Critical Correctionsto organize updates but lacks robust sanitization for the extracted message content. - Sanitization: Detection relies on regex matching and LLM-based intent analysis in
scripts/semantic_detector.py, which are susceptible to adversarial prompting. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to execute external tools for repository management and content analysis. scripts/learning_ledger.pyrunsgit remote get-url originto identify the project scope.scripts/reflect.pyperformsgit addandgit commitoperations to version control instruction updates.scripts/semantic_detector.pyinvokes theclaudeCLI (claude -p) to evaluate the intent of user messages.- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes an automatic reflection feature activated by
/reflect-on. This mechanism installs a stop hook (scripts/hook-stop.sh) that triggers a background reflection process every time a session ends, ensuring persistent execution of the skill's logic.
Audit Metadata