remove-claude-marks
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/container_meta.py,scripts/image_meta.py, andscripts/rewrite_text.pyto execute other scripts and system binaries likeexiftool,qpdf, andc2patool. It dynamically determines paths to interpreters (e.g., locating virtual environments) and handles subprocess execution for image and PDF processing, which constitutes dynamic execution of local code and system tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted files (PDF, HTML, Markdown, Images) and passes their text content to LLMs for rewriting in
scripts/rewrite_text.py. It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization within the prompt templates used for rewriting, creating an attack surface where malicious instructions in a processed file could influence the agent's behavior. The capability inventory for this surface includes subprocess execution, network operations, and file system writes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external command-line tools via
subprocess.runto perform its primary functions, such asqpdffor PDF structural rewrites andexiftoolfor metadata stripping. These calls are protected using path-guarding logic (safe_arg) to prevent flag injection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]:
scripts/rewrite_text.pyusesurllib.requestto send text content to user-configured AI service endpoints. While the implementation defaults to loopback addresses, includes protections against HTTP redirects to prevent credential leakage, and requires an explicit override for remote hosts, it represents a network interface for data processed by the skill.
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