agency-multi-platform-publisher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing multiple CLI tools such as
wechatsyncandbiliupto perform network uploads and platform synchronization. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the use of third-party external repositories and tools, specifically
xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcpandNemo2011/bilibili-api, which are not part of the standard trusted vendor lists. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external article files (e.g.,
article.md) as primary input, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the source content contains malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during the adaptation or synchronization process. - Ingestion points: The
source_fileortopicparameters allow loading external content into the agent context (File:SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or 'ignore' warnings for the input content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
wechatsync,biliup) and Python scripts (forbilibili-api-python). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or filtering the input article content before it is processed by style specialists or toolchain orchestration scripts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The technical deliverables include Python code templates (File:
SKILL.md) that involve importing and utilizing thebilibili_apilibrary, requiring the agent to generate and execute local script content.
Audit Metadata