openocd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local
openocdandarm-none-eabi-gdbbinaries through the Pythonsubprocessmodule. These operations are necessary for flashing firmware and managing on-chip debugging sessions. - Evidence:
scripts/openocd_run.py(line 199),scripts/openocd_gdb.py(line 72), andscripts/openocd_telnet.py(line 49). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
config.jsonfile contains hardcoded absolute file system paths that reveal the author's local Windows username ('甘宇'). While this exposes personally identifiable information (PII), it does not involve sensitive authentication secrets like API keys or passwords. - Evidence:
config.json(lines 4 and 7). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and parses output from debugger telnet sessions and GDB commands. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious data provided by a compromised hardware target (such as register names or memory strings) could be interpolated into the agent's context. The risk is considered low due to the structured parsing used by the scripts.
- Evidence: Parsing logic in
scripts/openocd_gdb_common.pyand response handling inscripts/openocd_telnet.py.
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