skills/haipingxu/social-science-claude-scholar/latex-conference-template-organizer/Gen Agent Trust Hub
latex-conference-template-organizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from user-uploaded
.zipfiles (SKILL.md Step 1) and fetches data from external conference URLs usingWebFetch(SKILL.md Step 6). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide explicit warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the processed LaTeX source files or website text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including file extraction, searching, directory creation, and file manipulation using shell commands (
unzip,grep,find,mkdir,cp,rm,cat) throughout SKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from the external files or URLs before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various shell commands to manage the file system and extract metadata from the LaTeX templates.
- Evidence: Uses
unzipto extract contents to/tmp,findandgrepto identify LaTeX components and document classes, andmkdir,cp, andrmfor restructuring the output directory and cleaning up temporary files.
Audit Metadata