latex-conference-template-organizer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from user-uploaded .zip files (SKILL.md Step 1) and fetches data from external conference URLs using WebFetch (SKILL.md Step 6).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide explicit warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the processed LaTeX source files or website text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including file extraction, searching, directory creation, and file manipulation using shell commands (unzip, grep, find, mkdir, cp, rm, cat) throughout SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from the external files or URLs before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various shell commands to manage the file system and extract metadata from the LaTeX templates.
  • Evidence: Uses unzip to extract contents to /tmp, find and grep to identify LaTeX components and document classes, and mkdir, cp, and rm for restructuring the output directory and cleaning up temporary files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 17, 2026, 06:16 PM