writing-humanizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text provided by the user and resides in an environment with file-modification capabilities. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in the text could be processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests text directly from the user chat or via the agent's file-reading tools when requested to 'humanize' specific content.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict delimiters (e.g., XML tags or specific block markers) to separate the data being analyzed from the processing instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment, as specified in the YAML configuration, allows for the use of
Read,Write,Edit,Grep, andGlobtools. - Sanitization: No explicit instructions are provided to the agent to sanitize the input or to disregard commands embedded within the text during the rewriting process.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation within
README.mdandWARP.mdprovides instructions for the user to download the skill repository from a third-party GitHub repository. - Details: The instructions suggest using
git clone https://github.com/blader/humanizer.gitto install the skill. This is a standard installation procedure for third-party extensions and is not an automated runtime execution by the agent itself.
Audit Metadata