pandoc-converter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands involving
pandoc,bash, andpython3, including the local scriptsscripts/convert-to-pdf.shandscripts/fix-ascii-art.pyfor document processing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Workflow instructions guide the agent to construct shell commands using user-provided file paths. This creates a surface for command injection if paths are not properly quoted, though the skill provides explicit warnings to the agent to quote all paths and verify file existence.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/convert-to-pdf.shscript dynamically generates a temporary LaTeX header file at runtime usingmktempand populates it with formatting directives before use in the conversion process. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Documentation in
README-zh.mdsuggests using shell process substitution (<()) to dynamically provide LaTeX headers topandoc, which involves executing a subshell command string. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted documents (Markdown, Word, HTML) which may contain malicious
pandocextensions, Lua filters, or LaTeX engine commands. If processed without strict restrictions, these files could trigger unauthorized file system access or code execution through thepandoctoolchain. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Documentation references external fonts and citation styles from well-known repositories on GitHub (such as
adobe-fontsand thecitation-style-languageproject) for environment configuration.
Audit Metadata