tapd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external TAPD work items (descriptions and comments), which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Found in
references/intake-gate.mdwhere descriptions and comments are retrieved via MCP. - Boundary markers: The skill implements specific delimiters (
【FLOW-SPEC-BEGIN:<spec_id>】) to distinguish managed specification blocks. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes various MCP tools for creating and updating requirements, tasks, and comments.
- Sanitization: This risk is effectively mitigated by the skill's mandatory safety policy (
references/safety-policy.md), which requires dry-runs and explicit human confirmation for all remote modifications. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local branch binding and environment setup involve executing shell commands.
- The bundled Node.js CLI tool (
scripts/tapd-context/dist/cli.js) executes standard Git commands to manage local branch state and bindings. - A diagnostic script
scripts/mcp_probe.mjsspawns child processes to verify connectivity and tool availability of the TAPD MCP server. - Both utilities are well-documented, operate on local state, and include mechanisms for redacting sensitive environment variables from their output.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions involve downloading and running dependencies from well-known sources.
- It utilizes the
mcp-server-tapdpackage from the official Python package registry (PyPI) to handle communication with the Tencent TAPD API. - User information is retrieved from the official Tencent TAPD API domain (
api.tapd.cn) via standard authenticated requests inscripts/get_current_user.py.
Audit Metadata