skills/hakityc/tapd-skill/tapd/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tapd

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external TAPD work items (descriptions and comments), which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Found in references/intake-gate.md where descriptions and comments are retrieved via MCP.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements specific delimiters (【FLOW-SPEC-BEGIN:<spec_id>】) to distinguish managed specification blocks.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes various MCP tools for creating and updating requirements, tasks, and comments.
  • Sanitization: This risk is effectively mitigated by the skill's mandatory safety policy (references/safety-policy.md), which requires dry-runs and explicit human confirmation for all remote modifications.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local branch binding and environment setup involve executing shell commands.
  • The bundled Node.js CLI tool (scripts/tapd-context/dist/cli.js) executes standard Git commands to manage local branch state and bindings.
  • A diagnostic script scripts/mcp_probe.mjs spawns child processes to verify connectivity and tool availability of the TAPD MCP server.
  • Both utilities are well-documented, operate on local state, and include mechanisms for redacting sensitive environment variables from their output.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions involve downloading and running dependencies from well-known sources.
  • It utilizes the mcp-server-tapd package from the official Python package registry (PyPI) to handle communication with the Tencent TAPD API.
  • User information is retrieved from the official Tencent TAPD API domain (api.tapd.cn) via standard authenticated requests in scripts/get_current_user.py.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 05:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tapd