ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides script templates that interpolate untrusted external data directly into AI prompts, creating a surface for potential injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Script examples read untrusted data from command-line arguments (e.g.,
$1inconditional_workflow.sh) and from local files (e.g.,$(cat $file)indata_processing.sh). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when inserting external content into the model prompts.
- Capability inventory: The workflows can execute AI model runs via the
beltCLI and perform filesystem writes via shell redirection. - Sanitization: No input validation or escaping is performed on the ingested data before prompt interpolation.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill explicitly documents how to set up scheduled automation using
crontabentries. While this is a legitimate feature for the stated purpose of AI automation, it is a mechanism used to maintain execution across system restarts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided templates include numerous shell scripts and a Python script using
subprocess.runto execute commands. These scripts perform operations such as creating directories (mkdir -p), reading files, and running thebeltCLI tool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests downloading code and configuration from external sources.
- References installation instructions hosted on a GitHub repository for the inference-sh platform.
- Suggests installing additional skills via
npx skills addfrom repositories associated with the platform's ecosystem. - Includes an example script using
curlto send data to a placeholder webhook domain (your-webhook.com) for error monitoring.
Audit Metadata