ai-avatar-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
beltCLI tool within a Bash environment to perform AI inference tasks. This includes commands for authentication (belt login) and executing specific AI models (belt app run) to generate media. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references documentation and asset samples from external domains including
inference.shand GitHub. It also provides instructions to extend environment capabilities using thenpx skills addcommand for thebelt-sh/cliandinference-sh/skillsrepositories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a pipeline for external media and text inputs, which introduces a potential surface for indirect prompt injection targeting the remote AI models.
- Ingestion points: User-provided image URLs, audio URLs, and text scripts (e.g.,
voice_script,voice_prompt) passed to thebeltCLI. - Boundary markers: Inputs are structured as JSON parameters, but the natural language fields lack explicit delimiters to separate user-provided content from system instructions in the underlying model prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI tool to interact with remote services; the tool's access is scoped to thebeltcommand via theallowed-toolsconfiguration. - Sanitization: No specific input sanitization or validation logic is defined within the provided skill instructions.
Audit Metadata