ai-content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes multi-step pipelines that ingest content from external sources (such as search results or blog posts) and interpolate this data into prompts for downstream AI models (e.g., Claude, FLUX, Kokoro).
- Ingestion points: Data from
Tavily Searchand user-provided<blog-content>placeholders are fed into model prompts inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The provided script examples do not utilize delimiters (like XML tags) or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions in the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI via Bash to execute AI tasks, write to local JSON files, and orchestrate media generation. - Sanitization: The documentation does not demonstrate sanitization, validation, or escaping of external content before it is interpolated into subsequent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and provides numerous examples for using the
beltCLI tool via Bash to perform AI generation and media merging tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external installation scripts and markdown guidelines hosted on the
inference-sh/skillsGitHub repository.
Audit Metadata