ai-content-pipeline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes multi-step pipelines that ingest content from external sources (such as search results or blog posts) and interpolate this data into prompts for downstream AI models (e.g., Claude, FLUX, Kokoro).
  • Ingestion points: Data from Tavily Search and user-provided <blog-content> placeholders are fed into model prompts in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The provided script examples do not utilize delimiters (like XML tags) or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions in the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the belt CLI via Bash to execute AI tasks, write to local JSON files, and orchestrate media generation.
  • Sanitization: The documentation does not demonstrate sanitization, validation, or escaping of external content before it is interpolated into subsequent prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and provides numerous examples for using the belt CLI tool via Bash to perform AI generation and media merging tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external installation scripts and markdown guidelines hosted on the inference-sh/skills GitHub repository.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 08:13 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-content-pipeline