ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection across multiple workflow patterns:
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from web search results (via
tavily/search-assistantinPattern 2), user-supplied arguments ($INPUT_TEXTinPattern 4), and local file contents ($(cat $file)inData Processing Pipeline). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or delimiters) or instructions for the models to ignore embedded directives in the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The workflows possess significant capabilities, including executing subprocesses via the
beltCLI, writing files to the local system, and making network requests viacurl(as seen in the alerting example). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested external content is performed before it is interpolated into prompts for models like Claude or Flux.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
monitored_workflow.shexample uses a wrapper function that executes arbitrary commands passed as arguments ($@). While designed for logging and alerting, this pattern allows for dynamic command execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to fetch installation instructions and additional skills from
github.com/inference-sh/skills. These are standard project dependencies and resources related to theinference.shplatform described in the skill.
Audit Metadata