infsh-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/authentication.mddirect the agent to execute a remote script viacurl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. Piped shell execution from remote sources is a critical security risk. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
belt app runcommand, documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/running-apps.md, is designed to automatically upload local files to the cloud when a path is provided. This functionality can be abused to exfiltrate sensitive files, such as~/.ssh/id_rsaor.envfiles, if the agent is manipulated into referencing them. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill reference files (
references/cli-reference.md) include commands for writing shell completions to/etc/bash_completion.d/infsh. This pattern involves writing to system directories, which typically requires elevated privileges and acts as a persistence mechanism. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches binaries, manifests, and checksums from
dist.inference.shduring the manual installation process described inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted local data (via
belt app run) and passes it to external AI services without boundary markers or sanitization, potentially allowing external content to influence agent behavior.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata