ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a Data Processing Pipeline and a Conditional Workflow that ingest untrusted external data.\n
- Ingestion points:
$(cat $file)indata_processing.shandINPUT_TEXT="$1"inconditional_workflow.sh.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; data is interpolated directly into the JSON input for the AI model without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill executes subprocess calls to the
beltCLI to run various AI models and services.\n - Sanitization: Absent; there is no escaping or validation of the ingested content before it is passed to the AI prompt.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The Quick Start section directs users to a remote installation script hosted on GitHub (
inference-sh/skills) to install the required CLI tool, which involves executing remote content.\n- [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill provides explicit instructions and templates for setting up persistence viacrontabentries to schedule recurring AI automation tasks.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The shell templates demonstrate unsafe variable interpolation (e.g.,"prompt": "$prompt...") which can lead to argument injection if inputs contain shell metacharacters. Furthermore, therun_with_alertutility function executes its arguments directly using$@, providing a pattern for arbitrary command execution.
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