ai-voice-cloning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted data into command arguments for voice synthesis.
- Ingestion points: User-provided text is passed directly into the
promptandtextfields of JSON payloads used with thebelt app runcommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potential commands embedded within the text to be spoken.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
beltCLI tool to perform audio generation, media merging, and video animation tasks. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the input text is performed before it is passed to the execution environment.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references installation instructions and configuration files from the inference.sh official domain and public GitHub repository.
- Evidence: References
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdand suggests installing thebelt-sh/clipackage vianpx. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
beltCLI tool to perform its primary functions, including application execution (belt app run) and session management (belt login).
Audit Metadata