ai-voice-cloning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted data into command arguments for voice synthesis.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided text is passed directly into the prompt and text fields of JSON payloads used with the belt app run command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potential commands embedded within the text to be spoken.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the belt CLI tool to perform audio generation, media merging, and video animation tasks.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the input text is performed before it is passed to the execution environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references installation instructions and configuration files from the inference.sh official domain and public GitHub repository.
  • Evidence: References https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md and suggests installing the belt-sh/cli package via npx.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the belt CLI tool to perform its primary functions, including application execution (belt app run) and session management (belt login).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 12, 2026, 10:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-voice-cloning