competitor-teardown

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external web sources via search engines and web extraction tools. This creates an attack surface where instructions hidden within third-party websites or search results could potentially influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned from tavily/search-assistant, exa/search, tavily/extract, and infsh/agent-browser calls within SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard embedded commands in the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution (belt CLI), remote Python execution, and network-based search tools.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or validation is present in the skill's instructions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and points to installation instructions hosted on a GitHub repository (inference-sh/skills). This is a standard practice for documenting dependencies on well-known version control platforms.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a remote Python execution environment (infsh/python-executor) to generate positioning maps. While the example provided uses standard visualization libraries, this interface allows for the assembly and execution of scripts at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 12, 2026, 10:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — competitor-teardown