competitor-teardown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external web sources via search engines and web extraction tools. This creates an attack surface where instructions hidden within third-party websites or search results could potentially influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data returned from
tavily/search-assistant,exa/search,tavily/extract, andinfsh/agent-browsercalls withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard embedded commands in the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution (
beltCLI), remote Python execution, and network-based search tools. - Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or validation is present in the skill's instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and points to installation instructions hosted on a GitHub repository (
inference-sh/skills). This is a standard practice for documenting dependencies on well-known version control platforms. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a remote Python execution environment (
infsh/python-executor) to generate positioning maps. While the example provided uses standard visualization libraries, this interface allows for the assembly and execution of scripts at runtime.
Audit Metadata