dialogue-audio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to install an external CLI utility using the command
npx skills add belt-sh/cli. It also references an external installation guide and script hosted on a public GitHub repository athttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdwhich is not a pre-verified trusted source. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of remote application logic through the
belt app runcommand. It triggers various remote models and utilities (e.g.,falai/dia-tts,infsh/media-merger) hosted on theinference.shplatform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's configuration explicitly requests broad shell execution capabilities for the
beltCLI tool viaallowed-tools: Bash(belt *). This allows the agent to perform administrative actions such asbelt loginand run arbitrary remote apps. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating user-provided text directly into CLI command arguments.
- Ingestion points: The
promptfield within the JSON input forbelt app runcommands found inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The text is wrapped in JSON quotes, but there are no instructions or delimiters to prevent the underlying synthesis model or CLI from being influenced by adversarial content within the dialogue text.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executebeltcommands with potentially unsanitized inputs. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering is present in the skill's instructions.
Audit Metadata