llm-models
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
beltCLI tool. This execution is properly scoped and restricted via theallowed-toolsfrontmatter configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references installation scripts and secondary skills located in the
inference-shorganization's public GitHub repositories. These resources are necessary for the intended functionality of the platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by taking user input and passing it to external language models, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the data being processed.
- Ingestion points: The
promptandsystemJSON fields provided to thebelt app runcommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiter or protection instructions are provided in the command templates.
- Capability inventory: The
belttool allows for authenticated LLM inference and interaction with various platform-hosted applications. - Sanitization: Input sanitization and safety filtering are deferred to the underlying LLM provider (e.g., Anthropic, Google).
Audit Metadata