llm-models

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the belt CLI tool. This execution is properly scoped and restricted via the allowed-tools frontmatter configuration.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references installation scripts and secondary skills located in the inference-sh organization's public GitHub repositories. These resources are necessary for the intended functionality of the platform.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by taking user input and passing it to external language models, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the data being processed.
  • Ingestion points: The prompt and system JSON fields provided to the belt app run command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiter or protection instructions are provided in the command templates.
  • Capability inventory: The belt tool allows for authenticated LLM inference and interaction with various platform-hosted applications.
  • Sanitization: Input sanitization and safety filtering are deferred to the underlying LLM provider (e.g., Anthropic, Google).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 12, 2026, 10:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — llm-models