web-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the installation of external tools via
npx skills add, specifically targetingbelt-sh/cliand otherinference-shresources. These are necessary components for integrating with the inference.sh platform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a restricted bash environment through
allowed-tools: Bash(belt *), which limits the agent to running commands related to thebeltCLI tool, following the principle of least privilege. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of external data from the web (via Tavily and Exa apps) and passes it to LLMs, which is a known attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Web content retrieved through apps like
tavily/extractandexa/extractis directly used in LLM prompts for summarization and research tasks (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not include delimiters or specific instructions to help the model distinguish between system instructions and potentially malicious content within the extracted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses the
beltCLI to perform searches and invoke AI models, restricted to thebeltcommand space. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation of the external web data before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata