bilibili-subtitle

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The install.sh script downloads and executes a script from pixi.sh via a pipe to bash. While pixi is a well-known tool, this installation pattern represents a potential remote code execution vector.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The bilibili_subtitle/preflight.py script reads the ~/BBDown.data file to check for Bilibili session cookies (SESSDATA). This file contains sensitive authentication data used to access the Bilibili account.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several modules, including bbdown_client.py, chunker.py, and transcribe_agent.py, use the subprocess module to execute external binaries like BBDown, ffmpeg, and ffprobe using arguments derived from user input.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The install.sh script uses the GitHub CLI to download nightly versions of the BBDown tool from the nilaoda/BBDown repository.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Bilibili video subtitles and transcripts. This data is ingested in subtitle_loader.py and passed to LLM agents for proofreading and summarization in agents/proofread_agent.py and agents/summarize_agent.py, which lack strong boundary delimiters between instructions and the untrusted external content. The skill has capabilities to write files and execute system commands.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://pixi.sh/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 26, 2026, 11:08 AM