bilibili-subtitle
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
install.shscript downloads and executes a script frompixi.shvia a pipe to bash. While pixi is a well-known tool, this installation pattern represents a potential remote code execution vector.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Thebilibili_subtitle/preflight.pyscript reads the~/BBDown.datafile to check for Bilibili session cookies (SESSDATA). This file contains sensitive authentication data used to access the Bilibili account.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several modules, includingbbdown_client.py,chunker.py, andtranscribe_agent.py, use thesubprocessmodule to execute external binaries likeBBDown,ffmpeg, andffprobeusing arguments derived from user input.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Theinstall.shscript uses the GitHub CLI to download nightly versions of theBBDowntool from thenilaoda/BBDownrepository.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Bilibili video subtitles and transcripts. This data is ingested insubtitle_loader.pyand passed to LLM agents for proofreading and summarization inagents/proofread_agent.pyandagents/summarize_agent.py, which lack strong boundary delimiters between instructions and the untrusted external content. The skill has capabilities to write files and execute system commands.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://pixi.sh/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
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