obos

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands to manage version control for the vault.
  • Evidence: commands/tidy.md includes instructions to execute git init, git add -A, and git commit to create a baseline before performing directory reorganization.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill references specific filesystem paths and accesses configuration files outside the immediate vault directory.
  • Evidence: commands/refine.md contains a hardcoded absolute fallback path /Users/hansonmei/OneDrive/obsidian-vault/ which discloses personal directory structures.
  • Evidence: commands/vault.md and commands/init.md read and write to a global configuration file located at ~/.proma/agent-workspaces/obsidian/obos-config.json.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-generated note content from the vault to synthesize answers and generate new content, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: commands/ask.md, commands/draft.md, and commands/refine.md read the contents of Markdown files from various vault directories (Notes/, Clippings/, References/).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the notes during synthesis tasks.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities across most commands and shell execution capabilities in commands/tidy.md.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is defined for the content extracted from the Obsidian notes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 05:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — obos