xiaohongshu-downloader
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external audio data from Xiaohongshu videos. This data is transcribed by Whisper and then interpolated into an LLM prompt for translation.
- Ingestion points: Transcribed audio segments are stored in
transcripts/audio.txtand then passed to the LLM via the{segment}placeholder in Step 7 ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings surrounding the interpolated
{segment}in the translation prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write to the file system (creating
transcript.mdand transcript folders) and execute shell commands (yt-dlp,whisper,ffmpeg,mv,awk). - Sanitization: No filtering, escaping, or validation is performed on the transcription output before it is sent to the LLM for translation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to perform its primary tasks.
- Bundled Script: It executes
scripts/download_xiaohongshu.shusing the bash interpreter. - Media Tools: It invokes
yt-dlp,ffmpeg, andwhisperthrough shell subprocesses. - File Management: It uses shell commands like
mv,cp,awk, andrmfor file manipulation and text processing. - Input Handling: In
SKILL.md, user-provided URLs are passed as arguments to the download script. While the instructions use single quotes for placeholders, a malicious URL containing a single quote could potentially attempt command injection if the agent does not apply strict escaping.
Audit Metadata