laohan-sousuo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from untrusted external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests content from external websites, official documentation, GitHub issues, and community platforms (Reddit, blogs) via the
anysearchandWebFetchtools. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the retrieved search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (via
python3andgh), read local files (implied by path references), and perform network operations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local scripts and command-line interfaces to perform its core functions.
- Evidence: The skill invokes
python3 ~/.claude/skills/anysearch/scripts/anysearch_cli.pyfor search operations and uses the GitHub CLI (gh) to search issues and releases. - Installation scripts: The installation section provides commands for creating symbolic links (
ln -s) and verifying paths (readlink), which represent local system modifications. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations that involve sending user-provided search queries to an external service.
- Evidence: Technical search queries are sent to
api.anysearch.com. While the skill includes a 'Security Boundary' section warning against including sensitive information in queries, the transmission of data to this third-party domain is a necessary part of the skill's functionality. - Vendor Context: The
anysearchservice appears to be a resource associated with the skill's author (hanzhcn).
Audit Metadata