meridian-privilege-escalation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly documents how to acquire maximum permissions and bypass sandbox restrictions.
- Instructions provide syntax for
--sandbox danger-full-access, which grants full filesystem and process access. - Instructions provide syntax for
--approval yolo, which enables the agent to approve all tool calls without user confirmation or prompts. - The documentation describes switching models specifically to "escape a local harness restriction," which is a technique for bypassing security controls.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that encourage bypassing safety protocols.
- It details how to "disable safety checks entirely" using broad overrides.
- It provides a manual for an agent to escalate its own permissions when it encounters "constrained permissions" or "restricted tools."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill demonstrates the execution of shell commands (
meridian spawn) with parameters that grant unrestricted capability over the host environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect injection by spawning subagents that process external files under elevated privileges.
- Ingestion points: External task files referenced via
--prompt-file task.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not suggest delimiters or warnings for the content of subagent prompt files.
- Capability inventory: The spawned subagents can gain full filesystem access, network access, and arbitrary tool execution when using the documented escalation flags (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the task file content is mentioned.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata