acl-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
SN-Execute-Background-Scripttool to run arbitrary server-side Javascript (GlideScript) on the ServiceNow platform. Evidence found in Phase 4 and 5 includes scripts for resetting the ACL cache, tracing evaluation logic, and checking user roles. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
SN-Query-TableandSN-Get-Table-Schematools when reading from tables likesys_security_acl. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved table data (e.g., within the
descriptionorscriptfields of an ACL record). - Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including record creation (
SN-Create-Record), updates (SN-Update-Record), and arbitrary script execution (SN-Execute-Background-Script). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of content retrieved from the ServiceNow instance before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata