claude-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to launch background processes by executing the host environment's CLI tool.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to run the commandclaude --bg --name "<descriptive name>" "<handoff summary>". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface where untrusted user input could influence the command executed in the shell.
- Ingestion points: User-provided arguments and conversation history are ingested in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific shell-escaping markers or delimiters are defined for the summary string within the command template.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses shell execution capabilities to launch the
claudeCLI (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly mandate the redaction of sensitive information like API keys and passwords, though it relies on the model's instruction following rather than programmatic escaping.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill handles potentially sensitive conversation data by passing it as a prompt to a new agent instance.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains a specific safety instruction: "Redact any sensitive information, such as API keys, passwords, or personally identifiable information, since the summary becomes the agent's prompt."
Audit Metadata