code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to resolve a "fixed point" (user-supplied branch name, commit SHA, or tag) by incorporating it directly into shell commands:
git rev-parse <fixed-point>andgit merge-base <fixed-point> HEAD. A malicious user could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|, or backticks) to execute arbitrary commands within the agent's operating environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the local repository and passes it into the prompts of two parallel sub-agents (Standards and Spec axes).
- Ingestion points: The skill captures the complete working-tree change set using
git diffand the full contents of all untracked files found viagit ls-files --others. It also reads repository documentation likeAGENTS.mdandCONTRIBUTING.md. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
git) and orchestrate multi-agent workflows via theAgenttool. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when interpolating the change-set content or spec files into the sub-agent prompts.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the ingested code or documentation content before it is processed by the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata