tmux
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts
scripts/spawn_subagent.shandscripts/send_command.shallow the parent agent to launch any shell command and interact with the standard input of tmux windows. This provides an unrestricted interface for command execution within the user's session. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The recommended workflow involves the parent agent reading the contents of files generated by subagents (e.g., in
/tmp/). This exposes the parent agent to instructions potentially hidden in untrusted data produced by external sub-processes. - Ingestion points: Reading files produced by subagents as described in the
SKILL.mdworkflow (step 4). - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not recommend using delimiters or specific 'ignore' blocks when reading and processing subagent data.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via tmux scripts, file system access, and the broad capabilities of the Devin CLI agents being orchestrated.
- Sanitization: Absent; the content is intended to be read directly from the filesystem without validation, escaping, or filtering.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation and scripts (
SKILL.md,scripts/spawn_subagent.sh) default to spawning subagents with the--permission-mode dangerousflag. This explicitly configures the agents to bypass standard security prompts for their actions, escalating their operational autonomy and increasing the impact of potential misuse.
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