manage-freeze-windows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it retrieves and processes external configurations (such as freeze window names, descriptions, and YAML) from the Harness platform. This content could potentially contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the output of the
harness_listandharness_gettools as referenced inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore commands that may be embedded within the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to perform state-changing operations using
harness_create,harness_update,harness_delete, andharness_execute. - Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement or instruction for sanitizing or validating the content of the external data before it is incorporated into the prompt context.
Audit Metadata