configure-repo-scan
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its workflow of reading and then writing back pipeline configuration data.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches existing pipeline definitions using the
harness_getMCP tool in Step 1. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to ensure the agent treats the fetched pipeline YAML as potentially untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
harness_updatetool in Step 7 to modify the pipeline definition, which is a high-privilege operation that affects CI/CD execution. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization logic for the pipeline YAML before it is parsed, modified, and resubmitted.
Audit Metadata