dbops-changeset
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user requests and external API data to generate executable database changesets, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests natural language descriptions from users (SKILL.md Step 4) and schema/instance metadata from Harness discovery APIs (Steps 1-3).
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the ingested data during prompt interpolation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to trigger remote database authoring pipelines through the
harness_executetool, which applies the generated Liquibase YAML to target environments. - Sanitization: While the skill normalizes usernames (lowercase, alphanumeric filtering), it does not provide formal escaping or sanitization for the Liquibase YAML generated from user inputs.
- Mitigation: The risk is significantly mitigated by a mandatory HITL review step (Accept / Deny / Accept & Commit) that requires the user to manually verify the generated code before execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions (reference.md) direct the agent to consult official Liquibase documentation at
docs.liquibase.comvia web search or fetch tools. This reference targets a well-known, authoritative documentation service for a legitimate technical purpose and does not constitute a security risk. - [SAFE]: The skill includes logic to resolve a required
conversation_idfor pipeline execution by accessing local Cursor IDE transcript metadata (~/.cursor/projects/.../agent-transcripts/). This access is used for functional session management (billing and idempotency keys) and is restricted to metadata relevant to the current agent session.
Audit Metadata