manage-pull-requests
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted data from pull request activity and descriptions.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches data from pull request resources via
harness_getand discussion timelines (comments) viaharness_listwithresource_type: "pr_activity". - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or include warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed PR content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has significant capabilities including merging pull requests (
harness_execute), deleting comments (harness_delete), and updating PR states (harness_update). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions from the ingested PR data.
Audit Metadata