template-usage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external template definitions retrieved via MCP tools, which can contain untrusted content that might influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests template definitions, versions, and metadata through the
harness_getandharness_searchtools as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the content returned by these tools as untrusted or to ignore any instructions embedded within the template YAML/JSON.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to read-only tools (
harness_list,harness_get,harness_search,harness_describe) and focuses on report generation; it does not have access to tools for file writing, network exfiltration, or shell command execution. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any validation or sanitization steps for the data retrieved before it is interpolated into the markdown reports defined in
references/report-templates.md.
Audit Metadata