harper-local-dev
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation in
AGENTS.mdandrules/running-dev-instances-in-worktrees.mdinstructs users to execute privileged commands usingsudo(e.g.,sudo ifconfig lo0 alias 127.0.0.$i up) to configure loopback address aliases on macOS. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documentation suggests installing a launchd daemon to maintain loopback alias configurations across reboots, which is a persistence mechanism for system configuration changes.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided
scripts/harper-dev.mjswrapper script utilizeschild_process.spawnandexecFileSyncto execute external binaries, includinggitand theharperdatabase server. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides a link to an external script source on GitHub (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HarperFast/skills/main/harper-local-dev/scripts/harper-dev.mjs) as an alternative for project setup. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface by ingesting untrusted data from the local environment.
- Ingestion points: The script reads the current working directory (
process.cwd()), output fromgit rev-parse, and the contents of a local.envfile. - Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: The script has capabilities to write files (
writeFileSync), delete files (rmSync), and spawn subprocesses (spawn,execFileSync). - Sanitization: The script includes a
cleanfunction that uses a regular expression (/[^\w.-]+/g) to sanitize project and checkout names before they are used in file paths, which mitigates simple path injection attacks.
Audit Metadata