setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructs the agent to install native hooks at the user level via the
forge hooks install --globalcommand. These hooks are designed to trigger during specific lifecycle events, representing a persistence mechanism that allows the tool to maintain influence over the agent's operating environment across different sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes the use of the
Bashtool with flags like--forceand--yes(e.g., inforge reset --hard --forceandforge setup --yes). These commands are specifically designed to bypass interactive safety prompts and perform destructive operations or configuration changes without manual confirmation, which could be exploited to cause unintended data loss. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions by interpolating user-provided inputs (such as harness names, directory paths, and configuration profiles) into shell commands executed via the
Bashtool, creating a surface for injection. - Ingestion points: Parameters supplied in user queries for initialization and setup commands in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified to delimit instructions from user-supplied data within the command strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read,Grep, andGlobtools as specified in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter. - Sanitization: There are no documented sanitization or validation routines to prevent command injection when user input is concatenated into the command-line arguments.
Audit Metadata