automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests standard shell access via
bashandrun_commandtools. This capability is appropriate and necessary for its stated purpose of providing workflow automation and integration services. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect injection as it processes external data from webhooks (
integrations.md), RAG corpora (rag.md), and voice transcripts (voice.md). - Ingestion points: Webhook payloads, vector store chunks, and STT streams.
- Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to "keep instructions out of untrusted input" in
prompt.mdand defines injection testing inaudit.md. - Capability inventory: Uses
bash,write_to_file, andrun_commandfor automation tasks. - Sanitization: Implements HMAC verification for webhooks and
webhook-guard.tsfor payload size limiting to prevent DoS. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
alert-router.tsscript includes functionality to send data to external webhooks (Slack, Discord, Telegram). This is documented behavior for an alert routing system and uses standard environment variable configurations for destination URLs. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
browser-relay.mdmode interacts with a local authenticated Chrome instance via a WebSocket relay (127.0.0.1:18795). While this grants high-level access to the user's browser sessions, the skill defines strict guardrails (Localhost binding, Zero Password Ingestion, and Redaction Gates) to mitigate risk. - [SAFE]: References to external services like Retell AI, Bland AI, Twilio, and Deepgram are documented for legitimate telephony and AI voice processing. All scripts use standard Node/Bun built-in modules (
node:crypto,node:fs,node:util) without suspicious external dependencies.
Audit Metadata