client-comms
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/client-comms.tscontains a shell command injection vulnerability in thegenerateClientChangelogfunction. The code usesexecSyncto execute agit logcommand where therefparameter is taken directly from command-line arguments. Although there is a check to ensure the argument does not start with a hyphen, it does not sanitize shell metacharacters like;,&, or|, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's intake process for client feedback, described in
references/feedback.mdand implemented inscripts/client-comms.ts, handles raw external data from emails and chat threads. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in client feedback could influence the agent's behavior. The agent possesses broad capabilities includingbashand file modification, and while 'Anti-Drift Boundaries' are mentioned, they do not provide a robust security barrier against adversarial prompts. Ingestion points include thetranslateClientFeedbackfunction and the feedback intake procedure. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The project handover protocol in
references/handover.mdinstructs the agent to 'log every item transferred' when managing sensitive credentials such as hosting, CMS, and app store logins. Recording these items in a persistent transfer log increases the risk of credential exposure if the logs are not strictly protected or are accidentally shared.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata