client-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Raw client feedback from calls, emails, and surveys in references/feedback.md, as well as Git commit history, issue tickets, and deployment logs in references/factual-reporting.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions for the ingested content to prevent the agent from following commands embedded in the external data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted access to powerful system tools including bash, run_command, write_to_file, and replace_file_content via the agents/openai.yaml configuration.
  • Sanitization: There are no procedures defined for escaping, validating, or filtering external content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to use tools like bash and run_command to perform factual verification tasks. While these tools are used for legitimate purposes, such as checking Git SHAs or test receipts in references/factual-reporting.md, they represent a broad capability surface that could be exploited if the agent is compromised via prompt injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 09:23 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — client-comms