design

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user briefs and external references across all modes (e.g., SKILL.md, references/ui.md). These inputs are interpolated into the agent context to guide design decisions. Given the skill's access to powerful tools like bash and write_to_file, malicious instructions embedded in a brief could potentially influence the agent to perform unintended actions. Ingestion points: Intake gates defined in SKILL.md and each mode reference. Boundary markers: The skill uses structured procedures and quality gates but lacks explicit delimiters or ignore-previous-instructions warnings for user input. Capability inventory: Access to bash, view_file, write_to_file, replace_file_content, grep_search, and find_by_name. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of brief content is documented before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the bash tool for specific technical operations. For example, references/3d.md provides a command for asset optimization using gltfpack, and references/graphics.md mentions executing a generate.js script via Bash.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: references/graphics.md references a tool-gated workflow involving the execution of a local generate.js script using Node.js and Bash, indicating that the skill is designed to interact with and execute external scripts at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 03:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — design