gauntlet-loop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/anti-drift.tsutility usesexecSyncto rungit diffwith asinceRefparameter directly sourced from command-line arguments without sanitization. An attacker providing a malicious reference string could execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
verifyDeployUrlfunction inscripts/anti-drift.tsperforms network requests usingfetchto arbitrary URLs provided via the--verify-deploycommand-line argument. This can be abused for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or to exfiltrate sensitive information to external servers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a multi-agent refinement loop that ingests and processes untrusted code from the workspace, creating an attack surface. 1. Ingestion points: Project files are read by the Builder and Fresh Critic agents, and by the
anti-drift.tsscript for audits. 2. Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any markers or delimiters to separate untrusted code from agent instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools includingbash,run_command, andwrite_to_file, allowing it to modify the file system and execute shell commands. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested code before it is processed by the agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata