research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process untrusted external content, including web pages, social media posts, and competitor landing pages, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Content fetched from the web, news sources, social media threads, and emails as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/market-pulse.md. - Boundary markers: The skill contains an explicit 'Untrusted-source guard' in
SKILL.mdand an 'Untrusted-content boundary' inreferences/competitor-analysis.mdthat instructs the agent to treat fetched data as cited claims only and never as instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including
bash,run_command,write_to_file, andreplace_file_contentvia theagents/openai.yamlconfiguration. - Sanitization: The instructions require the agent to attribute and assess sources, flagging agent-directed text rather than following it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell-based tools (
bash,run_command) to execute local processing tasks and a provided TypeScript utility. - Evidence: The
SKILL.mdreference toscripts/sample-size.tsindicates the use ofbunto run local mathematical scripts for sample size calculations. This is a legitimate use of the requested tools for the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata