agency-multi-platform-publisher
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides templates and instructions for users to input sensitive Bilibili session cookies (
sessdata,bili_jct,buvid3) directly into the agent's context. These cookies provide full account access and are high-value targets for exfiltration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and recommends tools from community-maintained GitHub repositories rather than official vendors. Specifically, it references
xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcpandNemo2011/bilibili-api, which are not verified or trusted organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing shell commands for
wechatsync,biliup, andxiaohongshu-mcp(via local daemon), which grants the skill significant control over the local environment for publishing operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from source files (
article.md) and passes it to multiple specialized sub-agents (e.g.,@zhihu-strategist). - Ingestion points: Reads content from
article.mdin Step 2 of the workflow. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or markers to distinguish between legitimate content and potentially malicious embedded instructions in the source file.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
wechatsync), perform network requests (curlto a local API), and upload files to remote servers. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the content before it is interpolated into prompts for the specialist agents or used in tool calls.
Audit Metadata