agency-multi-platform-publisher

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides templates and instructions for users to input sensitive Bilibili session cookies (sessdata, bili_jct, buvid3) directly into the agent's context. These cookies provide full account access and are high-value targets for exfiltration.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and recommends tools from community-maintained GitHub repositories rather than official vendors. Specifically, it references xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp and Nemo2011/bilibili-api, which are not verified or trusted organizations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing shell commands for wechatsync, biliup, and xiaohongshu-mcp (via local daemon), which grants the skill significant control over the local environment for publishing operations.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from source files (article.md) and passes it to multiple specialized sub-agents (e.g., @zhihu-strategist).
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from article.md in Step 2 of the workflow.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or markers to distinguish between legitimate content and potentially malicious embedded instructions in the source file.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (wechatsync), perform network requests (curl to a local API), and upload files to remote servers.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the content before it is interpolated into prompts for the specialist agents or used in tool calls.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 09:27 AM