code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates as an analysis engine for untrusted external code, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in code comments or data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data by reading project source files, git diffs, and patches via the
view_file,grep, andbashtools as defined inSKILL.mdandagents/openai.yaml. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate untrusted code content from the agent's internal instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the analyzed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted significant capabilities, including
bashfor shell command execution andedit_filefor modifying the local filesystem, particularly in thefixandreceivemodes. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the ingested code content before it is processed or interpolated into the analysis prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of powerful system tools to perform its tasks.
- Evidence: The skill configuration in
SKILL.mdandagents/openai.yamlexplicitly requires access tobashandedit_file. Infixmode, the skill is instructed to write and execute tests ('write it, watch it fail, then fix') using these tools on the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata