using-superpowers

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs high-pressure language and mandatory imperatives (e.g., 'ABSOLUTELY MUST', 'not negotiable', 'cannot rationalize your way out of this') in SKILL.md to override the AI's reasoning and safety filters regarding tool invocation.- [PERSISTENCE]: In references/codex-tools.md, the skill instructs the agent to modify the global Codex configuration file at ~/.codex/config.toml. These modifications change default subagent models and reasoning efforts, persisting behavioral overrides across future AI sessions.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates skill invocation if there is a '1% chance' of applicability, significantly increasing the attack surface for the agent to inadvertently follow malicious instructions contained in other workspace files or skills.
  • Ingestion points: Ingests instructions from workspace files like CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, and GEMINI.md, as well as other locally defined skills.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill commands the agent to prioritize these external instructions over default behaviors and to announce tool use before performing any safety checks or file explorations.
  • Capability inventory: The skill maps actions to powerful platform tools including terminal shell access (terminal, run_shell_command), file writing (write_file, patch), and subagent spawning.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content of the invoked skills is provided.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The platform-specific reference files (references/codex-tools.md, references/gemini-tools.md) describe procedures for spawning subagents using dynamic prompt templates. This involves the runtime assembly and execution of instructions based on potentially untrusted workspace data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 09:28 AM