summarise-granola
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/granola.pyuses the macOSsecurityutility to access the Keychain. This is required to retrieve the encryption key (DEK) used to decrypt the Granola app's local session files and extract the API access token. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Various scripts utilize
subprocess.runto call system and CLI tools: curlis used for authenticated interactions with the Granola API.gdocis used to search for and edit Google Documents.cmark-gfmis used to convert Markdown summaries into styled HTML.gitandrsyncare used within the update scripts.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes self-update scripts (
scripts/check-update.shandscripts/update-skill.sh) that fetch version metadata and source code from the author's public GitHub repository (HartreeWorks/skill--summarise-granola). This is a transparent mechanism to keep the skill's logic up to date. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted meeting transcripts.
- Ingestion points: Raw transcript text from
data/transcripts/is interpolated into agent prompts for the summarization (Step 3) and tidying (Step 8) workflows. - Boundary markers: The prompts currently lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to the LLM to disregard any directives found within the transcript text.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment includes tools for network communication (
curl,gdoc), file system modification, and credential retrieval (security). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the transcript content before it is processed by the agents.
Audit Metadata