refine-task
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted task data (titles, descriptions, and comments) using the
get_taskandlist_taskstools. Malicious instructions hidden within these task fields could attempt to override the agent's behavior during the refinement process.\n - Ingestion points: Task content retrieved via
get_taskandlist_tasksinSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or clear directives to the agent to treat the retrieved task content as data only and to ignore any embedded commands.\n
- Capability inventory:
update_task,create_task_comment,update_artifact, and codebase exploration (searching for related files/patterns) as defined inSKILL.md.\n - Sanitization: No input validation or content filtering is performed on the ingested task data before it is incorporated into the agent's reasoning workflow.
Audit Metadata