youtube-thumbnail
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command using a local Python script
tools/gen_thumbnail.pylocated within a virtual environment. The command includes several arguments derived from the project state and user input. - Evidence:
venv/Scripts/python tools/gen_thumbnail.py --prompt-file videos/<p>/packaging/thumbs/<X>.txt --out videos/<p>/packaging/thumbs/<X>.png --jpg --seed <N> - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect injection as it ingests data from a 'locked title' (generated by separate packaging logic) and user-supplied 'hook text'. These inputs are interpolated into prompt files and used to determine file paths for the rendering tool.
- Ingestion points: Project directory variables (
<p>,<X>), 'locked title' from preceding/packagingstage, and user-provided text for 'hook', 'sticker', and 'checkstrip' elements. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks technical sanitization for the project/file variables used in shell commands, though it does instruct the agent to echo the words back to the user before rendering.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
venv/Scripts/pythonto run a script, reads face libraries, and writes multiple files (.txt,.png,.jpg) to the filesystem. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping logic is described for the interpolation of user-supplied text into the shell command arguments or prompt files.
Audit Metadata