gemini-imagegen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external files which are then processed by an LLM.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/gemini_image_gen.pyreads content from files specified by the--input-image,--prompt-file, and--jobs(JSONL) command-line arguments. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to help it distinguish between system instructions and content within the ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the filesystem and make network requests to the Google Gemini API.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization of input file content or image data before passing it to the SDK.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a third-party Python library at runtime.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/cli.mdinstruct the use ofuv run --with google-genaito execute the skill's logic. - Source: The package is the official SDK from a well-known technology service provider and is required for the skill to communicate with the Gemini API.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a bundled Python script to perform its tasks.
- Evidence: Documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/cli.mdprovides multiple examples of executingscripts/gemini_image_gen.pyviauv run. - Context: These executions are scoped to the project and are used to provide the main functionality of the skill without requesting elevated system privileges.
Audit Metadata